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The Human and Historical Dimensions of Certainty
Arrête, misérable veuve malabare! Ne crois point ce fou qui te persuade que 
tu seras réunie à ton mari dans le délices d ’un autre monde si tu te brûles 
sur son bûcher. — Non, je me brûlerai; je suis certaine de vivre dans les 
délices avec mon époux; mon brame me Va dit.
Voltaire1
Such ‘thoughts’ grmu up unconsciously. They are picked up -  we know not 
hoiu. From obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate 
themselves into the mind and become unconsciously a part of our mental 
furniture. Tradition, instruction, imitation — all of xuhich depend upon 
authority in some form, or appeal to our own advantage, or fall in ivith a 
strong passion -  are responsible for them. Such thoughts are prejudices; that 
is, prejudgements, not conclusions reached as the result of personal mental 
activity, such as observing, collecting, and examining evidence. Even when 
they happen to be correct, their correctness is a matter of accident as far as
the person who entertains them is concerned.
John  Dewey2
I. The end of certainty, or its modification ?
Even though the m odern world may -  in some ways -  be more secure 
than it was in the past, at the theoretical level one notices a profound crisis 
of certainty, involving every field of life and culture3.
1 François-Marie A rouet de Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, in Œuvres completes de 
Voltaire, Chez A ntoine -  Augustin Renouard, Paris 1819, tomes I-VI, tome II, »Certain, 
Certitude«, pp. 347-353, pp. 350-351.
2 Jo h n  Dewey, How We Think. A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the 
Educative Process (1910), H eath  and Co., Lexington, Massachusetts 1933, p. 7.
3 Obviously one cannot speak of a com plete rupture between the vision of the past 
replete with certainty and that o f the present all a prey to uncertainty, in that there 
has always been this contrast between those who claimed to be in possession of absolute 
certainties and those who, on the other hand, argued their precarious and provisional 
nature. However, we hold that, today especially, the world of the so-called absolute
Filozofski vestnik, X IX  (2 /1 998), pp. 117-140. 117
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In physics, for example, the certainties o f Galileo regarding a universe 
created by God and written in a m athematical language, and those o f New­
ton, for whom the elegant compages o f the Sun, the planets and the com­
ets was guided by a single divine design, are countered in our century by the 
indeterminacy of quantum  physics and the principle o f uncertainty or in­
determinacy of W erner Heisenberg.
In geometry, the certainty and evidence of the Euclidean axioms, as 
existent geometrical entities which are the result o f  our intuition, are un ­
derm ined, especially following the discovery o f non-Euclidean geometry, by 
their arbitrariness and conventionality, reducing them  to primitive concepts 
or mere operative postulates.
In biology4 and in organic chemistry’, the certainties of a world in which 
God has ordered all things according to size, num ber and weight contrast 
with the strange intertwining of chance and necessity that one finds a t the 
origin o f life and biological evolution, these too invested, on a microscopic 
level, with a source of indetermination, deriving from the same quantic struc­
ture of matter, that is, from m utation.
In sociology, the scientific certainties o f a physique sociale, foretold by 
Comte and understood as the study of social phenom ena, obeying invaria­
ble laws ju st like natural phenom ena and thus subject to prediction, are 
opposed in our century by the opposite tendency which rejects all kinds of 
historical determinism whether idealistic or naturalistic, and in consequence 
any kind of historical prediction.
In the philosophy of history, the certainty o f a divine plan outlined by 
Hegel is countered by various forms o f critical ontologism, which see the 
individual or social group as the authors o f historical events, whose m ean­
ing depends on them alone. One sees a parallel process in the opposing 
camp of Marxian materialism: the idea of history as an ineluctable course 
of events, subject to the same laws that govern o ther natural phenom ena, 
has m et with similar anti-determinist argum ents0.
and definitive certainties is gradually disintegrating. See the reflections of a group of 
Italian thinkers on the ‘myth of certainty’: Marcello Pera, (Ed.) II mondo incerto, Laterza, 
Bari 1994.
4 Cf. Claude Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux 
végétaux, Vrin, Paris 1878, 2 vol., vol. I, p. 62: »Le déterm inism e n ’est donc que 
l’affirmation de la hi, partout, toujours... c’est l’affirmation que, suivant le m ot connu 
de l’antiquité: ‘Tous est fait avec ordre, poids et m esure’«.
5 In the laboratory ofjustus von Liebig the same biblical saying of Bible, cited by Bernard, 
was written: »God has ordered all things according to size, num ber and weight«.
6 Cf. Popper, »The Poverty of Historicism«, Economica, vol. 11, 1944, n. 42 (pp. 86-103) 
and n. 43 (pp. 119-137), 1945; The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge, London 
1945, 2 vol.
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In philosophy, the highest point of crisis, perhaps, was reached by Lud­
wig W ittgenstein and the logical positivists. Non only is it incapable of pro­
viding any certainty, being merely a m ethod of linguistic clarification, but it 
has lost even its traditional functions, i.e. the search for wisdom and critical 
discussion, traditional issues and certainties now held to be pure and sim­
ple pseudo-problems.
We do no t believe, however, that the situation is as alarming as it sounds, 
even though there have been radical changes in thought, especially with 
respect to the last century. Indeed, if we look at history, there has always been 
a constant stream  of new customs and ideas, and if we focus on the history 
of philosophy or science, even the strangest and most extravagant theories 
and ideas, although they have nearly always disturbed the well-educated of 
the time, in the long run  have been accepted and have become part of the 
traditional heritage as certainties to be counted on. Often the greatest dis­
senters and provocateurs of the past have been later considered to be perfectly 
trustworthy, their thoughts in accord with the common sense of the epoch. 
Moses, Socrates, Jesus, Saint Francis of Assisi, Erasmus, Luther, Giordano 
Bruno, Machiavelli, Campanella, Galileo, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Descartes, 
Kant, Marx, B. Russell, Gandhi, Einstein, etc. were all non-conformists whose 
thought and action went against the mainstream, and whose defiance of the 
social system of their day in some cases cost them their lives7.
We hold therefore that we should face the alteration of certainties with 
greater serenity, w ithout any form of philosophical or scientific panic, and 
that it is no t necessary to take the road that leads to scepticism, irrational­
ism, or nihilism. We m ust try instead to understand the nature of our cer­
tainties and their healthy modification.
In this paper, we will try to show that every certainty has a hum an and 
historic character, and therefore these apparent crises are none o ther than 
differing ways o f looking at certainty; or rather, it is precisely these events 
which often determ ine the progress of knowledge, since the abandonm ent 
o f certain convictions is usually followed by the acquisition of better and 
m ore fruitful forms o f knowledge, and all this seems to us to be a norm al 
hum an and historic process. O ur critical objective therefore, will be to re­
fute every absolute, static and definitive form of certainty, while trying to 
reveal the various obstacles which prevent man from achieving this.
7 See Dom enico Porzio (Ed.), Laprovocazione, Ferro, Milano 1972.
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II. Fallibilism and the construction of certainties
A fundamental assumption of our thesis is the intrinsic fallibility of man, 
which involves in various ways all sectors o f life and culture, such as to com­
pletely extinguish any kind of absolute and definitive certainty.
This conception of fallibilism has deep and variegated roots in the his­
tory of thought. We find it especially in Charles Peirce, who opposes it to 
‘infallibilism’ and considers it innate to the activity o f the researcher, who 
is aware of the errors to which scientific inquiry is prone. We find this vision 
in ancient thought, including eastern. Confucius, X enophanes and Jesus 
Christ all stress, in different ways, the intrinsic weakness and fragility o f 
hum an nature.
In our century, fallibilism seems to be an assum ption accepted in vari­
ous fields of knowledge and by various authors. Apart from in Karl Popper, 
where it is linked to his m ethod for conjecture and refutation and  to the 
falsificationist attitude8, we find it in Bertrand Russell, linked to the em pir­
ical, uncertain, inexact and partial nature of hum an knowledge, and in John  
Dewey, associated with the transient and relative nature of facts in a world 
in continuous evolution and with the correspondingly hypothetical nature 
of the conceptions and theories used to act on them  and explain them.
The assumption of fallibilism obviously has im m ediate repercussions 
for both philosophy and epistemology. Above all, we hold that its acceptance 
and therefore, the rejection of an absolute knowledge open the way to in­
quiry and truth. Indeed, the continuous em ergence of new problem atic sit­
uations makes it necessary at all times to seek provisional and approxim ate 
forms o f certainty. The creation and resolution o f problem s are in a state of 
continuous change and certainties are part of this perm anen t situation. 
Heraclitus, Bergson9, Lavelle, Merlau-Ponty10, Dewey11, Piaget12 Popper13, yet
8 Cf. Francesco Nuzzaci, Karl Popper. Un epistemologo fallibitista, Glaux, Napoli 1975.
9 H enry Bergson, Evolution créatrice, Alcan, Paris 1907.
10 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la philosophie, Gallimard, Paris 1953.
11 W hen we try, th rough  inquiry, to re-establish the d istu rbed  rela tionsh ip  o f the 
organism to the environm ent, we bring about new environm ental conditions which 
in their tu rn  are the cause of new problem s (Cfr. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 
Holt, New York 1938, chap. II).
12 Jean Piaget, L’équilibration des structures cognitives. Problème central du développement, Puf, 
Paris 1975. »Toute connaissance consiste à soulever de noveaux problèm es au fu r et 
à mesure q u ’elle résout les précédents«. Ibid., p. 36.
13 Life itself is the creation of new problems. »I conjecture that the origin of life and the 
origin of problems coincide«(Popper, »Autobiography of Karl Popper«, in Paul A. 
Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, O pen Court, La Salle, Illinois 1974, 2 vol., 
vol. I, p. 142). »Thus life proceeds, like scientific discovery, from  old problem s to the
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from completely different philosophical points of view, agree in m aintain­
ing a similar thesis, which stresses this changing and transient condition of 
the world and of life, including our knowledge.
The fact that one cannot establish absolute certainties, therefore, is not 
so m uch indicative of the weakness of m an’s cognitive powers, as of a real 
difficulty in knowing and living in an unstable and uncertain world in con­
tinuous evolution.
O ur very cognitive structures modify and adapt themselves continuously 
in relation to the environm ent in which every organism happens to live. Thus 
the im pact of the em ergence o f new discoveries or forms of knowledge can 
often cause a profound m odification or revolution. For example, Kant’s 
synthetic a priori d isin tegrated  following the discovery o f non-Euclidean 
geometry and the philosophical implications of quantum  m echanics14.
Piaget, Popper and Lorenz, following in the epistemological wake of 
Kant, also reject, for various motives, the synthetic a priori and favour a dy­
namic approach to the problem  of knowledge. The genetic epistemology 
of Piaget, im pregnated with a form of »kantisme dynamique«'*, and the evo- 
lutionistic epistemology of Popper10 and Lorenz17, the form er underlining 
the selective pressures to which scientific theories are subject and the o ther 
two the biological and evolutive roots of cognitive forms, distance themselves 
from  Kant’s synthetic a priori.
discovery o f new undream t-of problems« (Popper, »Epistemology W ithout a Knowing 
Subject« (1968), Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1972, chap. 3, p. 146.
14 We refer the reader here to Hans Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori, 
Univ. o f California Press, Berkeley -  Los Angeles 1920; Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of 
Scientific Philosophy, Univ. O f California Press, Berkeley -  Los Angeles 1951, chap. VIII; 
Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Dover, New York 1965, chap. XVIII.
15 Cf. Piaget, »L’épistem ologie des régulations«, in AA. W ., L’idée de régulation dans les 
sciences, Avant-propos de F. Perroux, Intr. d e j .  Piaget, Maloine, Paris 1977, p. X. 
A ccording to Piaget, it is a question of »de renoncer à V a priori ainsi conçu, ou si l’on 
préfère, de substituter à l’apriorism  un kantisme dynamique où l’innéité épistémique 
serait à rem placer par une succession de constructions form atrices«(Ibid.).
16 Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung, Verlag, Vienna, 1935; English translation, The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery (1959), H arper & Row, New York 1968, paragraphs 6, 30, 85, pp. 
42, 108, 251, 278-279; »Science: C onjectures and Refutations«, Conjectures and 
Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963), K  Paul, London 1972, chap. 1, 
pp. 46, 51-52; »Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowedge«, Conjectures 
and Refutations, op. cit., chap. 10, pp. 216-217; Popper, Objective Knowledge. An 
Evolutionary Approach, op. cit., chap. 1, pp. 16-20, 24; chap. 2, pp. 66 ff.; chap. 3, p. 121; 
chap. 6, pp. 242 ff.; chap. 7, pp. 261, 266-267.
17 K onrad Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels: Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen 
Erkennens, Verlag, M ünchen 1973.
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The assumption of fallibilism also leads us to accept a critical or falsifi- 
cationist methodology. Thejustificationist or inductive m ethod, in the clas­
sical sense up to the logical positivism of the V ienna Circle, is insufficient in 
that it is based on confirmation and not on critical testing o f theories.
Bernard and Popper especially have shown with great vigour the dan­
gers of this m ethod, proposing how it may be rectified. B ernard observes: 
» ...je  cherche autant à détruire m on hypothèse qu ’à la vérifier«18. Popper 
holds that one can never provide definitive justifications on the validity o f a 
theory, and thus the true scientific attitude is one which is critical, founded 
on the criterion of refutability or falsifiability.
Fallibilism also puts us on our guard against every form  of absolute 
certainty regarding scientific theories, in that they are always partial and 
provisional, representing only the curren t state of our knowledge19. In this 
way they are located between idealism and realism. They are our intellectu­
al instruments, but are also true representations o f reality, though they be 
approxim ate and provisional20.
Not only our knowledge but the very m ethods o f research of certain­
ties are subject to change and evolution, inasm uch as they derive no t only 
from epistemological sources, but above all from the same scientific prac­
tice that is changing continuously21.
III. Roots, forms and varying degrees of certainty; their human character
Given that the acceptance of certainties, in general, derives from a se­
rious critical research, yet the various necessities of life often oblige us to 
act on immediate certainties that come from  instinct, society, or culture.
The ancient sceptics and even Hum e held that it was unthinkable that 
one could live without relying on anything certain, w hether this be belief, 
custom o r habiP. However, if it is necessary to live trusting to certainties of
18 Bernard, Principes de Médecine expérimentale, Puf, Paris 1947, p. XXV; also Ibid., pp. 
220,251.
19 Bernard, Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale, Baillière, Paris 1865, p. 63.
20 Gf. Ibid., p. 63; Popper, »Three Views C oncern ing  H um an Knowledge« (1956), 
Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit., chap. 3, p. 117.
2! See especially Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, op. cit., »Preface 24 August 1938«, 
also chaps. I, XIX.
22 Cf. David Hum e, Enquiries, C larendon Press, O xford 1777, sect. V, part. I, pp. 43-47. 
»As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; bu t as a philosopher, who has some 
share o f curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation  o f this 
inference« {Ibid,, sect. IV, part II, p. 38).
122
The Human and Historical Dimensions of Certainty
this nature, it is also true that many other certainties, in order to be consid­
ered such, m ust be the fruit of our careful and continuous critical exami­
nation. However it may be, as Russell notes, we are obliged to learn to live 
w ithout absolute certainty yet without being paralysed by doubt and hesita­
tion23.
All this leads inevitably to the problem  of the nature and the validity 
of these certainties. The quest for certainty is rooted in the very existence 
o f hum an beings and constitutes one of their fundam ental needs. Man lives 
in a hazardous and risky world and is obliged to look for security, as Dewey 
acutely states24. The search for certainty is thus the objective correlate of the 
riskiness of the world and o f life, in o ther words of their instability and un­
certain ty25.
There exist various forms and degrees of certainty. There are the cer­
tainties of the com m on m an, different from those of the philosopher or of 
the scientist, and generally im pregnated with a naïve realism and many prej­
udices, in that he is no t accustomed to critical reflection on his acquired 
beliefs. T here are the certainties of the logical-mathematical sciences, that 
seem at first acquaintance to be absolute and definitive types of certainty. 
T here are also the certainties of the natural sciences, among which physics 
especially excels. T here are, finally, the certainties o f the so-called social 
sciences, which are the m ost debatable and the most prone to social, cul­
tural and econom ic conditioning.
A. Biological and cultural roots
These various forms of certainty, have, in our opinion, a common ori­
gin, in that they seem to be particularly rooted in the organic structures and 
in the cultural heritage o f a given individual.
From a biological po in t of view, the search for certainty corresponds 
to the need to re-establish the organic equilibrium, that is to say, the condi­
tions that allow us to continue to live. In any case, this search represents an 
attem pt to escape m om entarily from the constant problematic situation in 
which every organism  in the world finds itself.
23 Cf. B e rtra n d  R ussell, A History of Western Philosophy, U nw in, L o ndon  1945, 
»Introduction«; Bertrand Russell, TheProbtems of Philosophy (1912), Oxford Univ. Press, 
Oxford 1974, chap. 15.
24 Cf. Dewey, The Quest of Certainty. A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, Minton, 
Balch & Co., New York 1929, p. 3.
25 Dewey holds tha t people live their lives in an uncertain, precarious and dangerous 
world, whose existence involves hazards, in that it is the theatre o f risk, uncertainty 




All living things, including animals and plants, make use o f an enor­
mous and helpful -  yet always precarious -  baggage o f certain knowledge. 
T hroughout the long history of evolution, every organism has innum erable 
certainties stored in its genome and in its nerve structures, by which we m ean 
types of knowledge which have functioned in the environm ent in which it 
has lived and have allowed it to survive.
These biological structures, while they have guaranteed a high level of 
survival to every organism, man included, on the o ther hand  have often 
shown themselves to be unfit and insufficient for their own survival, since 
the environm ental situations are highly varied and changeable and at times 
even unpredictable. For this reason it is necessary to face these situations 
by inventing new strategies -  experim enting, that is, with new forms o f cer­
tainty. From a biological point of view therefore, humans, animals and plants 
go through life via a process of trial and error; strategies that correspond to 
successful situations are incorporated in the organism ’s behaviour and are 
held to be valid forms of certainty.
The life o f organisms on the Earth therefore, oscillates between ac­
quired certainties, m ore or less valid, and certainties that m ust be looked 
for; the form er may be considered to be forms of life already crowned with 
success and thus likely to be successful in the future, and the latter as at­
tempts or tests to find the solution to our existential problems.
Apart from these certainties, we possess a large store of knowledge and 
beliefs that come to us from the society and the cultural world in which we 
live. It is precisely these certainties which are the m ost controversial and 
problematic, and we notice this especially when we compare with o ther kinds 
of certainty belonging to other societies of our own time or of the past20.
The certainties which come to us from culture and society are thus the 
most exposed to error and often are accepted only because they are the fruit 
of socio-cultural conditioning27.
In the following pages, we proceed to a critical analysis of the various 
forms of certainty, highlighting their hum an and historic character.
B. The certainties of the common man, the philosopher and the scientist
First o f all we may make a distinction between the certainties of the 
common man, the philosopher and the scientist. The com m on m an is gen­
erally satisfied with his certainties, which have been transm itted to him  from
26 Descartes refers to this kind of certainty in the Discours de la Méthode, De l’Im prim erie 
de IAN M a ir e , Leyde 1637, Sec. partie, pp. 17-18.
27 Cf. Biaise Pascal, Pensées, Garnier, Paris 1964, Article IV, »Des moyens de croire«, p. 
142.
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infancy and which belong roughly to the predom inant form of knowledge 
in a given society in a specific period. Thus whether he be communist, lib­
eral, dem ocratic, Catholic, Protestant, Moslem, H indu or Buddhist, he pos­
sesses a given system of beliefs which for him are synonymous with certain­
ties. In the same way, each nation may boast a high percentage of members 
of particular political parties or believers in a particular religion, of which 
the individuals often know only a few marginal or superficial aspects, since 
their acceptance is no t the result of a detailed methodical examination, but 
merely a hurried , superficial and conditioned knowledge of a particular 
philosophical, political or religious doctrine, often even deliberately im­
posed. Indeed  history, right up to our own times, shows us that an individu­
al may even sacrifice his own life -  believing himself to be truly convinced -  
for this kind of certainty, which is not actually his, no t being the fruit of his 
critical or conscious appraisal. The sociology of knowledge has tried to throw 
light on the various mechanisms, be they economic (K. Marx), religious (M. 
W eber), social (K. M annheim ) or economic and cultural (Lenin, Mao, A. 
Labriola)28, which lie at the base of this social production of thought. Stud­
ies on cultural anthropology and the various forms of physiological and 
psychological conditioning are equally illuminating from this point of view20.
The philosopher too inevitably starts from these same cognitive con­
ditions, but rather than accepting passively this knowledge, considering them 
to be untouchable and definitive truths, establishes with them a relationship 
o f critical awareness. In o ther words, the certainties which we find deposit­
ed and silent in the m ind of the common man are questioned by the phi­
losopher, on whose shoulders the responsibility for judgem ent and choice 
comes to rest.
The scientist also receives from a young age an education founded on 
the dom inant knowledge of a certain epoch, that is he becomes a specialist 
in ‘norm al science’, as Thom as Kuhn would say. Yet even here, as with the 
philosopher, considering above all the progressive character of scientific 
knowledge, he m ust rem ain open to the acquisition of new certainties and, 
at the same time, he m ust have the courage, when the occasion presents 
itself, to abandon the old certainties or ‘paradigms’ of normal science. Even 
though the scientist’s process of critical revision of certainties is in one sense 
analogous to that o f the philosopher30, this process of critical testing is car-
28 These authors recognise an interaction between structure (economy) and super­
structure (culture o r Marxist criticism).
2U O ne thinks, for example, o f the classical conditioning of I. Pavlov and the instrumental 
or operan t conditioning of B. F. Skinner.
30 H ere too th e  starting  poin t is the dogmatic acceptance of a dom inant form  of 
knowledge, moving then to a critical and problem atic exam ination of it.
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ried out on a more solid basis, in that it is normally characterized by ration­
al and experimental procedures.
C. The certainties of the natural and moral sciences are different in kind 
One other im portant distinction which we believe is necessary to make 
concerns the certainties of the natural and m oral sciences. Socrates31 was 
perhaps the first to consider moral virtue as being on the same level as sci­
ence, thus establishing that ethics is a form of knowledge. Spinoza, in Eth­
ics, using the geometric m ethod of Euclid and trusting to the same concep­
tion of the intuitive evidence of axioms, made a further attem pt to reinforce 
and present in a more m odern way this same construct of ethical-cognitive 
parallelism. Albert Einstein seems to have moved in the same direction when 
he held that one can derive a moral starting from premisses having the same 
function as the axioms in mathematics. He attributes the ‘discovery’ of these 
in the field of ethics to ‘inspired individuals’32 (alas, how many such indi­
viduals have caused enormous damage to hum anity!), and these same axi­
oms are indicated in both the Jewish and Christian traditions33. In this way 
‘the laws of science and ethics’ m ight be considered together in that they 
are both axiomatic systems.
Now without wishing to draw a rigid boundary between these two types 
of knowledge, since the exchange of concepts between the two is very fre­
quent and fruitful, we do however believe that it will be useful to m aintain 
a general philosophical distinction in this sense.
In the m odern period, Kant especially has m aintained that the catego­
ries of knowledge concerning logic and mathematics and the empirical sci­
ences on the one hand, and moral questions on the other, are o f different 
kinds and thus even their epistemological bases are different. Before Kant, 
it was Hum e who maintained, at the end of his Enquiries, that one m ust dis­
tinguish between questions of quantity or num bers or empirical matters, and 
all the others, which he held to be only »sophistry and illusion«. In our cen­
tury, Russell,34 W ittgenstein3"’ and the logical positivists, among whom espe­
cially R. Carnap and H. Reichenbach313, have, with differing emphasis, m ain­
31 Protagoras, 36Iab.
32 Cf. Einstein, Out of My Later Years, Philosophical Library, New York 1950, »Year 1950«.
33 Cf. Ibid., »Year 1939«.
34 Cf. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, op. cit., chap. 31.
35 Cf. Ludwig W ittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Phitosophicus ( 1922), T he G erm an tex t o f L. 
W ittgenstein’s Logisch-PhilosophischeAbhandtung (1921), In troduction  by B. Russell, 
Routledge and K. Paul, London 1972, propp. 6.4 -  6.421. »Es ist klar, daß sich die 
Ethik n icht aussprechen läß t... Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins «(Ibid., prop. 6.421)
30 He maintains that moral axioms are no t principles o f knowledge. Cf. Reichenbach, 
The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, op. cit., chap. IV.
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tained -  in our view correctly -  this same thesis regarding the inadmissibil­
ity of gnoseological reduction o f moral assertions.
D. The certainties of the logical-mathematical and natural sciences
As well as this distinction between the certainties o f the natural and 
m oral sciences, it is also necessary to stress the autonomy and the independ­
ence of logical and m athem atical certainties from empirical ones and to 
uncouple the form er from their supposedly intuitive or evident character, 
which in the past has conferred on them a kind of absolute status.
Today, in general, it is held that the certainties of the logical-mathemat­
ical sciences have a tautological, arbitrary and conventional character, and 
that as such, they are the product of man and do not impose themselves on 
him in an absolute m anner. These truths may be considered to be empiri­
cally certain only insofar as they refer to reality. As a matter of fact, the prob­
lem of the hum an and conventional character of these constructs and their 
applicability to reality was resolved by A. Einstein, who stated: »As far as the 
laws of m athematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they 
are certain, they do no t refer to reality«37.
The certainties o f the natural sciences are of a completely different 
nature to those o f the logical and mathematical sciences, in that they are 
subject to rigorous empirical testing. Indeed, it is sufficient to consider the 
history of science to realize that no scientific theory has stood the test of time. 
Bernard, Russell, Bachelard, Lenin and Popper especially have stressed this 
progressive and approxim ate character of scientific knowledge, in the sense 
that every theory generally constitutes a step forward with respect to a pre­
vious theory, and a deeper understanding.
Some authors, especially Bernard, Bachelard and Popper, have added 
to these two natures of progression and approximation that of rectification 
or correction. Since the theories are in any case exposed to error, scientific 
progress is achieved above all by continuously rectifying them, where possi­
ble, until one is obliged to abandon the theory in question altogether, open­
ing up a completely new and different path of inquiry, as in the case of a 
scientific revolution.
E. The certainties regarding the human sciences: the example of equality
The certainties regarding the human sciences, while of a different char­
acter to those of the natural sciences, are not absolute either, but depend 
on the feeling o f hum anity of the men of a given historical epoch. Indeed, 
a rapid glance at any particular issue or episode in the history of philoso-
37 Cf. Einstein, Sidelights o f Relativity, Dutton, New York 1923, pp. 27-45, p. 27.
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phy, politics, law or some other hum anist discipline, is enough to realize that 
such knowledge is characterized by relativism, which is linked in turn  to the 
sense o f humanity of the individual thinkers or people, and to the very his­
torical conditions in which they lived. These certainties are no t progressive, 
unlike those of the logical-mathematical and natural sciences, which gener­
ally are. We shall take as an example the concept of equality38 in its moral, 
political and juridical senses.
Plato and Aristotle argued for the equality of all free citizens, bu t this 
conception of theirs was rather limited. Plato affirm ed the political equali­
ty of the sexes but in his opinion only a tiny few could aspire to knowledge. 
Aristotle limited his equality to free citizens alone, excluding the slaves, 
whom he believed to be such by nature. The A thenian Pericles preached 
the political equality of all Athenians, excluding however slaves and foreign­
ers.
The first to support equality for all m en were the stoics, for whom its 
roots lay in reason and virtue. In the Christian tradition there has been strong 
support for the religious equality of all before God, since they were one in 
Jesus Christ and brothers in that they were all sons of God.
Until the Middle Ages the western m onarchical regimes strongly limit­
ed individual liberties and thus curtailed considerably the m oral and ju rid ­
ical equality of the citizens. Strong pressures towards this only began to be 
felt by the time of the Renaissance; in the eighteenth  century especially, 
political equality was to make great strides, particularly with the French 
Revolution, which made it a fundam ental principle: égalité, fraternité et lib- 
erté were the mutually supporting foundations of a new social reconstruction. 
In the n ineteenth  century the socialist and com m unist m ovem ents pro­
pounded the new concept of economic equality, based on the equal distri­
bution of wealth. Christian communism gave way to economic communism, 
and for this reason these two concepts of equality, although philosophically 
opposed, sometimes found common ground. Today, in nearly every coun­
try in the world, there are efforts to apply the Universal D eclaration of 
Hum an Rights (1948), which holds all m en to be free and equal in dignity 
and rights.
These few observations serve to show how diverse people’s conceptions 
concerning one moral, political or juridical notion may be, and how far this 
may be linked to other general conceptions o f a philosophical, religious, 
political, or economic kind, and to a historical situation.
38 Cf. Stanley I. Benn, »Equality«, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (The), M acmillan, London 
1972, 8 vol., volume 3, pp. 38-42.
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The same situation of relativism may be noticed for o ther philosophi­
cal, m oral or jurid ical concepts.
IV. The scientific attitude and the acquisition of certainties
After this brief critical examination of the diverse forms of certainty, 
we would like to consider, as far as is possible in this context, the way in which 
we may come into contact with them.
In the hum an sciences, in our opinion the best way to arrive at some 
acceptable form  of certainty consists in trusting to a sincere, hum an and 
disinterested desire for truth. Therefore, the only m ethod which to us ap­
pears acceptable is that of free research and critical discussion, even if in 
this field there are no  fixed points of reference or secure criteria of truth.
The reflections of Russell, Dewey and Popper are of great help in this 
sense. We agree in general with Dewey, when he asserts that even here one 
may use the scientific m ethod, by which we mean an attitude rather than a 
collection of rules. From a negative point of view, this means freedom  from 
the slavery o f habit, from  prejudice, from dogma and from every passively 
accepted tradition; from  a positive point of view, this means a desire for 
research, for exam ination on the basis of solid facts and sufficiently gath­
ered  data, with a view to the resolution of our doubts and problems39. Sim­
ilar advice, in our view valid, is given by Russell, when he considers the prin­
cipal aim of philosophy to be knowledge, in particular that kind of knowl­
edge »which results from  a critical examination of the grounds of our con­
victions, prejudices, and beliefs«40. A similar scientific methodology is also 
p ropounded by Popper, who associates the m ethod used in science for con­
jectures and refutations with the critical method, used in the field of hum an 
sciences and based on rational discussion. Essentially this consists of formu­
lating »one’s problem  clearly and of examining its various proposed solu­
tions critically«41.
However, if the characteristics of the m ethod of free research and ra­
tional discussion are imprecise and without closely defined limits, those of 
the empirical sciences are m ore determ ined and one may discuss them with 
greater profit and using m ore convincing arguments.
3U Cf. Dewey, »Unity of Science as a Social Problem«, International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, Ed. by N eurath  and others, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago 1938.
40 Russell, The problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 90.
41 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit. (1968); »Preface to the first English 
edition, 1959«, p. 16.
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We do not have space here to discuss the problem s o f m ethod in the 
empirical sciences. We will limit ourselves to declaring our support for the 
scientific methodology of Bernard and Popper regarding the insistence on 
the necessity for testing and refutability or falsifiability (Popper) o f scientif­
ic theories. Both of these authors rightly stress the dangers of confirm ation 
and the necessity o f a strict critical analysis o f scientific theories.
V. Certainties and prejudices
The search for truth or certainty has always gone hand in hand  with 
the attem pt to identify the errors and obstacles that stand in its way. We re­
m em ber here F. Bacon’s theory of the idola and the m ore m odern theory 
of the obstacles épistemologique of Gaston Bachelard42. The obstacles have been 
of various kinds and so have the m ethods to try and elim inate them. H ere 
we will examine this problem and pu t forward our own thesis for its resolu­
tion.
We wish to underline here that the abdication o f an attentive and im­
partial scrutiny of our own knowledge or certainties constitutes one of the 
biggest cognitive obstacles; whereas on the o ther hand, an attitude found­
ed on doubt, on free research and on rigorous critical appraisal can protect 
us from a facile or naïve acceptance o f certainties. An attitude o f this kind, 
which sees in the binomial »doubt-research« the engine of knowledge, leads 
us back especially to Aristotle, Descartes, Bernard, Russell, Peirce43, Dewey 
and Popper, who all stressed with greater vigour than others the value of 
doubt and inquiry for the establishment o f our own knowledge or certain­
ties.
Among the biggest obstacles to the achievem ent of tru th  and certainty 
is prejudice, which, as the etymology of the word suggests (prae-iudicium), is 
ajudgem ent that anticipates or precedes knowledge obtained directly, based 
on critical examination of the evidence or arguments. As Voltaire states: »Le 
préjugé est une opinion sans jugem ent. Ainsi dans toute la terre, on inspire 
aux enfants toutes les opinons qu ’on veut, avant q u ’ils puissentjuger«44.
Prejudices are often linked to superstition o r to various forms of be­
lief. These may be seen as acquired or unconscious certainties, rooted in our
42 Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l ’esprit scientifique. Contribution à une psycanalyse de la 
connaissance objective, Vrin, Paris 1938.
43 See The Fixation of Belief (1877) and How to Make our Ideas Clear ( 1878).
44 Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, in Les oevres complètes de Voltaire; The Complete Works 
of Voltaire, Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1994, volumes 35 and 36, vol. 36, p. 456.
130
The Human and Historical Dimensions of Certainty
very behaviour and ways o f thinking. We may also include in this category 
the taboos o f certain indigenous tribes, seen as a rigid code of rules to be 
observed, im posed by tradition , whose magical explanation lies beyond 
hum an control45. Besides being associated with heavy forms of social and 
cultural conditioning, prejudices are also encouraged by our own mental 
laziness, and thus by a lack of responsibility in subjecting these kinds of 
knowledge to a careful critical analysis. The quote from J. Dewey at the be­
ginning of this discussion provides an eloquent interpretation of them  and 
also shows us how, through rigorous inquiry, we may free ourselves from 
them.
Prejudices may be of various kinds, they all have in common the fact 
that they are prem ature judgem ents and sometimes simple habits of mind. 
In sum, they are accepted passively and in any case before any conscious and 
critical research411. The greater part of them are nurtured -  as B. Russell tells 
us -  by the strength o f tradition and our passions, but what makes us free 
from these two vincula is no t so much a question of any particular convic­
tions we may have, as the way in which we have formed them, that is, how 
we have come to have them.
It is extremely easy therefore, for political or religious authorities to 
inculcate, via the acquisition of certain habits, similar beliefs in young indi­
viduals. Such a technique has been already noted by Pascal, who writes in 
the Pensées:
»... Car it ne fa u t pas se méconnaître: nous sommes automate autant q u ’esprit; 
et de là vient que l ’instrument par lequel la persuasion se fa it n ’est pas la seule 
démonstration. Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne 
convainquent que l ’esprit. La coutume fa it nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus 
crues; elle incline l ’automate, qui entraîne l ’esprit sans q u ’il y pense. Qui a 
démontré qu ’il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons ? Et q u ’y a-t-il déplus cru ? 
c ’est donc la coutume qui nous en persuade; c’est elle qui fa it tant de chrétiens 
c ’est elle qui fa it les Turcs, les païens, les métiers, les soldats, etc. (Il y a la fo i reçue 
dans le baptême aux Chrétiens de plus q u ’aux Turcs.)«.*’1
Being thus able to create beliefs and certainties, habits can also serve 
to eradicate them , if used in the opposite way: as Laplace48 observes, we may 
use Pascal’s m ethod to remove prejudices.
45 See Jam es G. Frazer, The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion (12 vol., 1907- 
15), O xford Un. Press, London, 1994.
40 As is known, above all F. Bacon (Novum Organum, 1620) and Descartes (Principia 
Philosophiae, 1644; Regulae ad directionem ingenii, [1629] 1701; Discours de la Méthode, 
1637) placed g reat value on this critical re-exam ination of ou r certainties and 
prejudices.
47 Pascal, op. cit., p. 142.
48 Essai philosophique sur les probabilités (1814), Gauthier-Villars, Paris 1921.
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It is now clear that appropriate techniques of physical and psychological 
conditioning or deconditioning can lead to the same results49. Shakespeare was 
right then when he said: »For use almost can change the stamp of nature«50.
It is necessary to add immediately however, that while habit and vari­
ous forms o f deconditioning may be used to remove prejudices, we would 
like to stress that this can also be achieved by appealing to reason. With this, 
we can destroy the various emotions or thoughts that assail our minds, as 
Descartes51 and before him Buddha52 and Chuang-tzu taught. In the field 
of children’s education, John  Locke53 advised us to appeal to reason as soon 
as the child understands language, so as to elim inate unwanted tendencies 
and bad habits and allow the child to be corrected and guided.
VI. Obstacles and certainties
A. Against absolute, immediate and a priori knowledge 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle o f a philosophical nature is that of con­
fusing ‘o u r’ truths for absolute and eternal knowledge. This sort o f obsta­
cle can hinder the progress of knowledge considerably.
A single exam ple concern ing  the discovery o f non-E uclidean  ge­
ometries will suffice to dem onstrate the difficulties which can obstruct sci­
entific discoveries, thanks to a few philosophical prejudices. Ludovico Gey- 
m onat observes that A. M. Legendre »while getting very close to a resolu­
tion o f the debate [on non-Euclidean geom etries], d id  n o t m anage to 
achieve this, above all because he was held back by a serious philosophical 
prejudice: that of conceiving the postulate o f parallels as an absolutely cer­
tain truth, and of asserting therefore, that the only task of m athem atics in 
this regard was to discover a satisfactory logical dem onstration. It was pre­
cisely this philosophical error which prevented the French school from  in­
troducing non-Euclidean geometries to the world, thus adding to the many 
other merits acquired in the period we are dealing with here. Instead the 
credit for this im portant discovery goes to Gauss, Lobacevskij and Bolyai«54.
4!l See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Britannica CD 98, 1994-1997: »Conditioning«, 
»Physical conditioning«; see also Konrad Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels: Versuch einer 
Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens, Verlag, M ünchen 1973, chap. VI, par. 7.
50 Hamlet, Act. III, sc. 4, 168.
51 Les passions de l’âme, Guinard, Paris, 1650, Articles 41, 43 and especially 45-50.
52 K  E. N eum ann e G. De Lorenzo (Eds.), I  discorsi di Gotamo Buddho, Laterza, Bari 
1969, 3 vol. See especially »Ogni mania«, Part 1, II; »Spavento e terrore«, Ibid.
53 Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), Clay, London 1895, par. 81.
54 Geymonat, Storia della matematica, in Nicola Abbagnano, Storia delle scienze, U tet, Torino 
1962, 3 vol., vol. I, pp. 305-662, p. 575.
132
The Human and Historical Dimensions of Certainty
A nother obstacle for the formation of our certainties or knowledge is 
an unquestioning faith in immediate knowledge, originating from both sen­
sations and intuition.
As regards imm ediate knowledge deriving from sensations, empiricists 
and materialists especially have often fallen into this kind of gnoseological 
trap; w ithout wishing to detract from the merits of these sources of knowl­
edge, one m ust however take the necessary precautions with respect to such 
cognitive positions. In the first decades of this century, following the influx 
of Russell’s logical atomism and M ach’s doctrine of sensations, Wittgenstein 
and the m em bers of the V ienna Circle traced the sources of knowledge to 
ou r sensations. R. Carnap55 in this regard elaborated a ‘theory of the con­
stitu tion’ based on the reduction of all forms of knowledge to the data pro­
vided by our senses. This is no t the place for an adequate critical discussion 
o f this neopositivist program m e, but the inextricable difficulties into which 
this kind of reductionism  leads have by now been amply noted: in the gnose­
ological field the result was a subjectivist idealism5*’, and in the m ethodolog­
ical field, the proposed criterion of verifiability or empirical significance had 
the effect of m aking philosophy itself redundant, along with all theoretical 
elements, including epistemology and the very laws of science, none of these 
being verifiable by, or reducible to, sensory data.
Im m ediate knowledge based on intuition also has its risks. In fact these 
are even greater in that while knowledge deriving from sensations has more 
o r less reliable foundations, intuitive knowledge is founded in the final anal­
ysis on the gnoseological presumption that we ourselves, perhaps illuminated 
by God, are the only sources of knowledge. This form of knowledge, there­
fore, is subject to neither empirical nor rational evaluation.
A priori certainties constitute another kind of obstacle, of a purely phil­
osophical nature. W hen we refer to these certainties we do not mean, obvi­
ously, the analytic or a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, 
which possess this certainty solely in virtue of their form. We refer rather to 
all o ther propositions which claim to be certain by appealing to absolute and 
self-evident principles or premisses, in conformity with purely rational or 
intuitive guarantees. The appeal of Aristotle and Descartes to such intuitive 
principles is characteristic in this regard. Throughout the course of the ide­
alistic and rationalistic tradition, analogous appeals and guarantees have 
assumed different forms, but the cognitive basis has remained the same, and 
is lacking in any critical testing of an empirical nature.
55 Der logische A uflau  der Welt, Verlag, Berlin 1928.
r,f’ See the critique ante litteram by V. I. Lenin (Materializm i Empirio-krititsizm, Moscow 
1909) of M ach’s doctrine of sensations and therefore of logical positivism.
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B. Political ideologies and mechanisms of social control
Another form of obstacle concerns political ideologies. Like o ther prej­
udices, these are often determ ined by the social and cultural environm ent 
or by economic interests, veiled by sophisticated forms o f rationalisation.
According to Marx, as is known, these ideological forms ( ideologischen 
Formen), like all o ther theoretical creations or form s of knowledge (theo­
retischen Erzeugnisse und Formen des Bewußtseins)57, are determ ined by existing 
social relations and thus no intellectual critique can eradicate these inter­
est-linked prejudices o f the ru ling  classes (interessierten Vorurteilen der 
herrschenden Klassen)™. Now, while crediting this thesis with a certain validi­
ty, we do no t accept that any form of political certainty m ust necessarily be 
an interest-based ideology. The dialectical materialists are wrong to consid­
er this assertion absolutely valid, to consider it, in o ther words, an absolute 
certainty. Such an assertion in fact, in order to gain a certain philosophical 
dignity, would have to deny, at least for itself, that it is merely the fruit or the 
necessary result of a social condition. To consider certainties as none other 
than ideologies produced by social conditions o f life, even if this analysis is 
largely true, cannot however be accepted in an absolute sense. Indeed, in this 
way, all the assertions and theories Marx and Engels themselves would collapse 
or lose meaning, precisely because they are merely social productions.
There exist therefore, certainties which are ju st ideologies, that is the 
result of political and social situations and conditioning; however, no t all 
certainties o f this kind are really so. Here too, it is necessary to examine them 
critically, without neglecting Marx’s own methodology, in order to see clearly 
their intrinsic validity.
A nother category of obstacle, which hinders a careful and conscious 
formation o f certainty, is represented by certain social mechanisms of con­
trol or certain procedures that serve to protect special forms o f knowledge 
or social and political norms. Michel Foucault59 has clarified these diverse 
mechanisms and forms of exclusion of speech. Essentially, he asserts -  wise­
ly in our view -  that in any society the production o f discourse is at once 
m onitored, selected, organized and distributed via a certain num ber of pro­
cedures, which are imposed and m aintained by a complex o f institutions, 
with the aim  of controlling it. Furtherm ore, these procedures are no t im­
posed without the use of force, or w ithout at least an elem ent of violence.
57 Cf. K, Marx, F. Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie, »I., Feuerbach«, in Werke, Verlag, Berlin 
1964, Band 3, 1845-46, pp. 37-8.
58 Cf. Marx, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, »Worwort« 1859, in Marx, Engels, Werke, 
op. cit., Band 13, 1859-60, esp. p. 11.
r>(J L’ordre du discours, Gallimard, Paris 1971.
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Obviously we m ust no t forget that above all the mass media, especially 
television, newspapers and often even the big publishing houses, being held 
usually by political parties o r industrial or financial magnates, often carry 
out this rôle o f social control to perfection.
VII. Epistemological obstacles
A. Scientific ignorance and W eltanschauungen
H am let says to Horatio: »There are more things in heaven and earth, 
H oratio, /  than are dream t o f in your philosophy«“ . T here is more philos­
ophy in life than in the books of philosophy. Philosophical problems, in 
o ther words, have their roots in real life, and this has numerous aspects, one 
of which, extremely im portant, concerns the natural sciences. To take an 
interest in philosophy, therefore, without some kind o f scientific prepara­
tion is an undertaking that may be doom ed to failure. It is superfluous to 
recall here that the greatest philosophers have often also been em inent sci­
entists, from Aristotle to Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, Einstein and 
Heisenberg.
For example, how can we hope to resolve the problem  of the relation­
ship between body and m ind, without some knowledge of physiology and 
the pathology of the brain? How can we tackle the problem  of the place of 
m an in the universe, w ithout studying, from a scientific point of view, the 
origin o f life or Darwin’s theory of evolution? Again, how can we examine 
the problem  of knowledge, without the rudim ents of the physiology of per­
ception, or o f quantum  physics and the theory of relativity?
Even the various visions of the world can act as epistemological obsta­
cles. A lthough every one o f us, often unconsciously, has their own vision of 
the world and life, and although this may function as a guide and a means 
o f orientation even in many o f our practical actions, yet these visions can­
not be held to be absolutely certain. Not always do they help us to live, nor 
are they useful from  a scientific point of view. On the contrary, often they 
can becom e real obstacles, in both a practical and a scientific sense.
Bachelard, Popper, Koyré and Kuhn, from different points of view, have 
tried to throw some light on the various psychological, philosophical and 
sociological mechanisms responsible for this sort of brake or inhibition of 
thought.
00 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act. I, sc. 5, 166-7.
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Gaston Bachelard, who sees in orthopsychisme the fundam ental problem  
of epistemology61, holds that it is often necessary to try to rectify or reject 
the various Weltanschauungen which from  time to time obstruct the progress 
of knowledge02.
Karl Popper, while on the one hand attributing an im portant propel­
lant function to these visions, comparing them to great metaphysical hypoth­
eses or research programmes, on the other, sees in their refutation one of 
the best moments of scientific growth1’3.
In the same way Alexandre Koyré1’4 has dem onstrated, in his work on 
the history of science, the inhibiting or stim ulating function of these differ­
ing visions o f the world.
Thomas Kuhn05 has shown us the quantity and the nature o f the forms 
of psychological and sociological resistance on which the growth of science 
is founded. He focuses on the interplay of the various Gestalten and visions 
of the world in the advancement of scientific knowledge.
B. Justificationism
A nother im portant obstacle in the path of science is represented by a 
kind of justificationist attitude or tendency to confirm ation. F. Bacon, Ber­
nard and Popper are perhaps the authors who have particularly, and better 
than the others613, highlighted such a danger, and while Bacon — in our view
-  did no t succeed in loosing these intellectual bonds67, B ernard and Pop­
per did.
Bernard, within the framework o f a determ inist methodology based on 
counterproof (modus tollens)№, has stressed the risks that derive from  an
1,1 Cf. Bachelard, Le rationalisme appliqué, Vrin, Paris 1949, p. 66.
62 Bachelard, La formation de l’esprit scientifique, op. cit.; La philosophie du non, Puf, Paris 
1940.
03 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit., paragraphes 4, 79, and  esp. 85; Realism 
and the Aim of Science, From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, Rowman, 
Totowa, Newjersey 1982, esp. »Introduction 1982«, pp. XIX-XXXIX.
CA Du monde de l ’à-peu-près à l’univers de la précision, Colin, Paris 1961; La révolution 
astronomique, H erm ann, Paris 1961.
65 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, In ternational Encyclopedia of U nified Science, 
vol. 2, n. 2, Chicago, London, 1962.
r,li These psychological mechanisms tending  to confirm ation, due to feelings of fear, 
melancholy, jealousy, candour, etc, had been highlighted in the literary field by 
Giovanni Boccaccio (Decameron) and by William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar, Othello). 
See Nuzzaci, K. Popper, op. cit., pp .73-4.
fl7 See Nuzzaci, op. cit., pp. 73-7.
f'8 The counterproof, which is an experimentum crucis, is a highly critical m om ent, and 
puts our theories to the hardest test (cfr. Bernard, Introduction, op. cit., pp. 97-100).
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approach linked to the verification or justification of one’s own theories09. He 
also observes, with great psychological subtlety, that our very desire or anxious­
ness to confirm the hoped-for results of an experiment are serious obstacles to 
scientific discovery70.
Popper especially dedicated a large part of his intellectual efforts to plac­
ing us on our guard against this jus tificationist attitude, so dangerous for scien­
tific research. We will do no m ore her than mention the great methodological 
importance of the criterion of falsifiability, proposed by Popper and on which 
much of his thought hinges71. This falsificationist attitude, based on philosoph­
ical fallibilism72, is sharply opposed to the justificationist attitude.
C. Absolute belief in facts’ and in theories or systems
Absolute belief in facts or data also constitutes a large obstacle to the for­
mation of scientific knowledge.
The old form of positivism especially assigned to these a decisive rôle for 
the knowledge of trudi; but Claude Bernard73, around the middle of the nine­
teenth century, had already noted with great clarity that every fact must be in­
terpreted, and that there is no such thing as a pure fact exempt from theory.
However, while a blind belief in facts is a serious obstacle to scientific knowl­
edge, it is also true that one must use them as a basis on which to construct laws 
and theories. Indeed, science is based on a, correct and balanced interaction be­
tween facts and theories: the former are the building-blocks of science; the theo­
ries are like the buildings that are designed and constructed starting from these. 
This interaction between facts and theories was lucidly illustrated by Bernard74 
himself, but Comte before him had also noted that a »stérile accumulation de 
faits incohérents« does not in itself constitute the science, which is rather found­
ed »dans les lois des phénom ènes... à laquelle les faits proprement dits... ne four­
nissent d ’indispensables matériaux«75. In our century Dewey70 and Popper77 es­
pecially have lucidly illustrated this same interaction of facts and theories.
r,u Bernard, Principes, op. cit., pp. 251, 220.
70 Bernard, Ibid., pp. 220-221.
71 Cf. Nuzzaci, K. Popper, pp. 41 ff.
72 Cf. Ibid. »It so happens that the real linch-pin of my thought about human knowledge 
is fallibilism and the critical approach»; Popper, Realism and The Aim of Science, op. cit., 
par. IV, p. XXXV.
73 Cf. Introduction, op. cit., p. 93.
74 Cf. Principes, op. cit., pp. 226, 229.
75 Cf. Com te, Discours sur l ’esprit positif (1844), Vrin, Paris 1974, par. 15, p. 24.
7fi How We Think, op. cit., chap. VII; Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, op. cit., chap. VI.
77 Cf. Popper, »Science: Conjectures and Refutations«, Conjectures and Refutations, op. 
cit., chap. 1; »The Bucket and the Searchlight. Two Theories o f Knowledge«, Objective 
Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, op. cit., pp. 341-361.
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In the wake o f the old positivism came the philosophers o f the Vienna 
Circle and of logical positivism, reform ulating these ‘facts’ in various ways. 
For Wittgenstein, one of the greatest inspirational figures o f neopositivism, 
they are the existence of states of affairs ( das Bestehen von Sachverhalten)78 and 
we can create for ourselves images of these states of affairs that correspond 
to reality with the construction of elem entary propositions (Elementarsätze)79, 
which are thus images of reality80.
This gnoseological approach, which we also find in the logical atom ­
ism of Russell and the scientific philosophy of the Vienna Circle, has had 
im portant philosophical and epistemological consequences. First and fore­
most, it has provided the pretext for closing the doors to every philosophi­
cal debate, philosophy not being able to constitute itself from  elem entary 
or atomic propositions, being no m ore than a means of linguistic clarifica­
tion81; secondly, this conception has expunged from science, as being insig­
nificant, scientific laws and hypotheses, since these cannot be constituted 
from such propositions either82.
If a blind belief in facts, w ithout their in terp reta tion  or theoretical 
explanation, can be a source of great difficulty, an excessive faith in theo­
ries or in pure reasoning can have the same effect. In this sense, theories 
are identical to systems, in that they are pure constructions of thought.
Absolute faith in pure or a priori theories and in systems constitutes a 
serious obstacle to the growth of scientific knowledge, and here  too the 
epistemological warnings of Bernard, together with those o f H erm ann von 
Helmholtz, should be considered highly useful.
In sum, the flaws of systems lie in their purely deductive or logical con­
struction, confusing coherent truths with truths that correspond in some way 
with reality. Freed from this relationship with reality, their constructions may 
become fantastic and unreal. Systems have som ething in com m on with hy­
potheses, which, if they are sanctioned by experim ent may becom e laws or 
theories; if, on the other hand, they are regulated only by logic, they become 
systems83. Scientific theories are actual in terpreta tions o f reality, despite 
being always provisional and approxim ate84.
78 W ittgenstein, Tractatus, op. cit., prop. 2.
70 Ibid., propp. 4.26, 4.21.
80 Cf. Ibid, prop. 2.141: »Das Bild ist eine Tatsache«.
81 Cf. Ibid., prop. 4.112 »Der Zweck d er Philosophie ist die logische K larüng der 
Gedanken. Die Philosophie ist keine Lehre, sondern  eine Tätigkeit»; M. Schlick, 
»Die W ende der Philosophie«, Erkenntnis, I, 1930, pp. 4-11.
82 For a critique in this sense, see Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit., par. 4.
83 Cf. Bernard, Introduction, op. cit., pp. 385-386.
84 Ibid., p. 63.
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Helmholtz rightly holds that it is a grave mistake to believe that thought 
can base itself on logical consequentiality and the completeness of the sys­
tem alone, irrespective of its natural foundation, i.e. observation and per­
ception, thus taking flight in the world of metaphysical reasoning85.
VIII. For a human construction of certainty
Let us try to sum up briefly the principal conclusions to which we have 
come.
Above all, it appears to us that the very fact, amply shown by history, of 
the diversity and plurality of the so-called absolute certainties, shows that they 
cannot be so, and that, in consequence they must be seen rather as certain­
ties of m an’s own m aking and historically conditioned.
Moreover, we are of the opinion that it is essential to distinguish be­
tween various forms and degrees of certainty. There are the certainties of 
logic and m athematics that have a high degree of reliability and there are 
the certainties o f the em pirical or natural sciences which are also highly 
probable. T here are, finally, moral and religious certainties, which are of a 
completely d ifferen t character from logical-mathematical and empirical 
ones. It is here that the most dangerous deceptions lie, since often -  as we 
have seen — they are only the fruit of socio-cultural conditioning, unlike our 
certainties, by which we m ean the result of our conscious and responsible 
research. Continuous and rigorous research, centred on m an’s intelligence 
and capacity for inquiry, seems to us one of the best ways to avoid being 
carried away by the irrational and impetuous wind of various political, mor­
al and religious fanaticisms.
T heir com m on assumption, in any case, while admitting their diversi­
ty and reliability, seems to us to be fallibilism, and it is for this motive that 
we have opted, in the field of the empirical sciences for a tougher form of 
scientific testing than that of verifiability, i.e. falsifiability, latent in the work 
of Bernard m ore than a century ago, and set out explicitly with refined log­
ical techniques by Popper. As far as the acceptance of hum an and social 
certainties is concerned, however, it seems to us more appropriate to trust 
to the m ethod of research and free discussion, centred on the sense of hu­
manity of every man and on a sincere and disinterested desire for truth, while 
accepting that in these fields of knowledge it is difficult to achieve objective 
certainty, and in many cases -  in our opinion -  no t even desirable. The
85 Cf. H erm ann von H elm holtz, Das Denken in der Medecin, Berlin 1877; in Helmholtz, 
Vorträge und Reden, fourth  edition, Braunschweig, II, pp. 165-190.
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im portant thing is to try to create a world where each may live, in respect 
and love for the others, with his own opinions and lifestyle, tolerating as far 
as is possible those o f o ther people. In this way democracy, tolerance, liber­
ty, equality, love, justice, happiness and o ther noble sentiments may becom e 
mutually supporting.
Above all in the social and hum an field, therefore, tolerance, so dear 
to Voltaire, is still today, precious and indispensable.
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